Tuesday, February 12, 2019
A Humean Theory of Distributive Justice Essay -- Hume Dworkin Entrepre
This paper suggests a strategy for constructing a contemporary Humean supposition of separative referee which would serve to ground what I call an entrepreneurial welf ar acres. It is argued that blending David Humes insights ab tabu the origins and purposes of justice with Ronald Dworkins insurance-based reasoning supporting his equivalence of resources model of distri stillive justice will yield a state which, as a matter of justice, encourages its members to engage in entrepreneurial activities and which protects them from the clear up extremes of market economies. IntroductionI claim that an attractive theory of distributive justice can be constructed by blending David Humes ideas about the origins and purposes of justice with Ronald Dworkins insurance-based justification for his equality of resources model of distributive justice. The resulting theoryless egalitarian than Dworkins and more liberal than Humesrecommends adopting an entrepreneurial welfare state..Hume on the Human lieuHume begins his account of the origins of justice by observing that animals tend to fit into dickens categories either they are lion-like, having substantial needs and great resources with which to satisfy those needs, or they are sheep-like, having little in the way of abilities to satisfy their needs but also having correspondingly few needs. All animals have abilities and capacities sufficient to achieve their needs. Both lions, with their prodigious appetites and office of satisfying those appetites, and sheep, with their modest appetites and modest means of satisfying those appetites, could survive on their own in the wild.But humans, Hume claims, are quite different. Like lions, we have substantial needs. But like sheep, we hav... ... and give of Equality, page 72, (italics added).17. We can distinguish between two kinds of luck filling luck and brute luck. Option luck is a matter of how regard and calculated gambles turn outwhether someone gains or loses thr ough pass judgment an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and strength have declined... Brute luck is a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles. Dworkin, Sovereign sexual abstention The Theory and Practice of Equality, page 73.18. The ideas in this paper benefited from comments by audiences at the Atlantic Regional philosophical Association meetings at Acadia University, the Canadian Philosophical Association meetings at Memorial University, and at the Philosophy Department at Dalhousie University. For extended discussion I thank Nathan Brett, Susan Dimock, Duncan MacIntosh, and Thea E. Smith.